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Abstract
In cake-cutting, strategy-proofness is a very costly requirement in terms of
fairness: for n = 2 it implies a dictatorial allocation, whereas for n ≥ 3 it re-
quires that one agent receives no cake. We show that a weaker version of this
property recently suggested by Troyan and Morril, called not-obvious manip-
ulability, is compatible with the strong fairness property of proportionality,
which guarantees that each agent receives 1/n of the cake. Both properties
are satisfied by the leftmost leaves mechanism, an adaptation of the Dubins
- Spanier moving knife procedure. Most other classical proportional mecha-
nisms in literature are obviously manipulable, including the original moving
knife mechanism. Not-obvious manipulability explains why leftmost leaves
is manipulated less often in practice than other proportional mechanisms.
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1. Introduction
The division of a single good among several agents who value different
parts of it distinctly is one of the oldest fair division problems, going as far
back as the division of land between Abram and Lot (Genesis 13). Since its
formalization as the cake-cutting problem (Steinhaus, 1948), this research
question has inspired a large interdisciplinary literature which has proposed
mechanisms that produce fair allocations without giving agents incentives
to misrepresent their preferences over the cake. Unfortunately, Braˆnzei and
Miltersen (2015) show that any deterministic strategy-proof mechanism sug-
gests a dictatorial allocation for n = 2, and that one agent must receive no
cake at all for n ≥ 3, documenting a strong tension between fairness and
incentives properties.
Nevertheless, recent results in applied mechanism design have shown that,
even if mechanisms can be manipulated in theory, they are not always ma-
nipulated in practice. Some manipulations are more likely to be observed
than others, particularly those which are salient or require less computation.
Based on this observation, Troyan and Morrill (2019) have proposed a weaker
version of strategy-proofness for direct mechanisms, called not-obvious ma-
nipulability (NOM). They define a manipulation as obvious if it yields a
higher utility than truth-telling in either the best- or worst-case scenarios.
A mechanism is NOM if it admits no obvious manipulation. Their notion of
NOM is a compelling one, since it does not require prior beliefs about other
agents’ types, and compares mechanisms only based on two scenarios which
are particularly salient and which require less cognitive effort to compute.
They show that NOM accurately predicts the level of manipulability that
different mechanisms experience in practice in school choice and auctions.
In this paper, we provide a natural extension of NOM to indirect mecha-
nisms, and show that the stark conflict between fairness and truth-telling in
cake-cutting disappears if we weaken strategy-proofness to NOM. In particu-
lar, NOM is compatible with the strong fairness property of proportionality,
which guarantees each agent 1/n of the cake. Both properties are satisfied by
a discrete adaptation of the moving knife mechanism (Dubins and Spanier,
1961), in which all agents cut the cake and the agent with the smallest cut
receives all the cake to the left of his cut and leaves. This procedure is also
procedurally fair and easy to implement in practice. NOM is violated by most
other classical proportional mechanisms, even by the original Dubins-Spanier
procedure, which shows that theoretically equivalent mechanisms may have
different “obvious” incentive properties for boundedly rational agents. NOM
partially explains why leftmost leaves is manipulated less frequently than
other cake-cutting mechanisms in practice (Kyropoulou et al., 2019).
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2. Related Literature
The cake-cutting problem has been studied for decades, given its numer-
ous applications to the division of land, inheritances, and cloud computing
(Brams and Taylor, 1996; Moulin, 2004). Most of the cake-cutting literature
studies indirect revelation mechanisms, in which agents are asked to reveal
their valuation over the cake via specific messages such as cuts and evalua-
tions. In particular, the computer science literature focuses on the so called
Robertson–Webb mechanisms (Robertson and Webb, 1998), in which agents
can only use two types of messages: either an agent cuts a piece of the cake
having a specific value, or he evaluates an existing piece by revealing his
utility for it. Most well-known mechanisms in the literature, such as cut and
choose, can be expressed as a combination of these two operations.
The main result relating fairness and incentive properties in cake-cutting
was put forward by Braˆnzei and Miltersen (2015). They show that with three
or more agents, every strategy-proof Robertson–Webb mechanism assigns no
cake to at least one agent. Their result builds on a weaker result by Kurokawa
et al. (2013) regarding mechanisms that have a bounded number of messages.
To allow for some degree of fairness and truth-telling, the literature has
considered four research avenues.
The first one is to use randomized mechanisms. For example, Mossel
and Tamuz (2010) show that truth-telling in expectation and approximate
proportionality can be obtained with probabilistic mechanisms. In this paper
we consider deterministic mechanisms only.
The second is to restrict the set of possible valuations over the cake. In
this line, Chen et al. (2013) provide a complex deterministic mechanism that
is both strategy-proof and proportional for a restricted class of utilities called
piecewise linear. Their mechanism may waste pieces of cake which remain
unassigned, something that never occurs with the proportional and NOM
mechanism we identify.
A third research avenue studies allocation mechanisms in which an agent
can only increase his utility by ǫ by misrepresenting his preferences, compared
to the utility he obtains from truth-telling. Menon and Larson (2017) and
Kyropoulou et al. (2019) obtain bounds on the amount of extra utility that
agents can guarantee by lying in proportional cake-cutting mechanisms.
In this paper, we explore a fourth way to escape the conflict between
fairness and truth-telling, which is relaxing the strategy-proofness defini-
tion to the one of NOM. NOM is a stronger version of an existing weak
truth-telling property in the cake-cutting literature called maximin strategy-
proofness, proposed by Brams et al. (2006, 2008). We discuss the relationship
between these two concepts in detail in the next section.
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3. Model
3.1. Outcomes, agents and types
In a general mechanism design problem, there is a set of possible outcomes
X , a set of agents N , and a set of possible agent-types Θ = Πi∈NΘi. In the
particular case of cake cutting, there is an interval [0, 1] called the cake. A
union of subintervals of [0, 1] is called a piece of the cake. The outcome-set
X is the set of allocations — ordered partitions of [0, 1] into n disjoint pieces.
X ∈ X denotes an arbitrary allocation and Xi denotes the piece allocated to
agent i.
The type-set Θ is the set of possible utility functions, where a utility
function is a non-atomic measure — an additive function that maps each
piece to a non-negative number. The utility of the entire cake is normalized
to 1. The utility of agent i with type θi is denoted by ui. That ui is non-
atomic allows us to ignore the boundaries of intervals. Another implication
of nonatomicity is that ui is divisible, i.e. for every subinterval [x, y] and 0 ≤
λ ≤ 1, there exists a point z ∈ [x, y] such that ui([x, z]; θi) = λ ui([x, y]; θi).
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3.2. Extensive forms and mechanisms
An extensive form is an arborescence A that consists of a set of labelled
nodes H and a set of directed edges E.2 The root node is h0. Each terminal
node is labelled with an allocation of the cake. Each non-terminal node h is
labelled with a non-empty subset of agents N(h) who have to answer a query
about their type. N(h) is said to be the set of players active at h.
In a general extensive form, the query may be arbitrary, for example
asking agents to fully reveal their type. In a Robertson–Webb extensive form,
only two types of queries are allowed:
1. Cut query : the query cut(i; x, α) asks agent i the minimum point y ∈
[0; 1] such that ui([x, y]; θi) = α; where α ∈ [0, 1] and x is an existing
cut point or 0 or 1. The point y becomes a cut point.
2. Eval query : the query eval(i; x, y) asks agent i for its value for the inter-
val [x, y], that is, eval(i; x, y) = ui([x, y]; θi) where x, y are a previously
made cut points or 0 or 1.
1Both ui and θi are equivalent — the type of an agent is the agent’s utility, so our
notation is slightly redundant. Nevertheless, we use it to make the comparison with
Troyan and Morrill (2019) straightforward.
2An arborescence is a directed, rooted tree in which all edges point away from the root.
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All agents must reply to the queries and their answers must be dynami-
cally consistent, meaning that there must be a possible type for which such
a sequence of answers is truthful.3 However, agents’ answers may be un-
truthful. For every possible combination of agents’ answers to the queries at
node h, there is an edge from h to another node h′. Thus, answers to queries
and edges have a one-to-one relationship. Note that, since the valuations are
real numbers, there are uncountably many edges emanating from each node.
Figure 1 illustrates a small subset of an extensive form A.
cut(1; 0, 0.5)
eval(2; 0, 0.6)







Figure 1: An example of an extensive form representing cut and choose.
We make the following two standard informational assumptions (Moore
and Repullo, 1988). First, at each node h all agents know the entire history
of the play. Second, if more than one agent is active at node h, they answer
their corresponding queries simultaneously.
The indirect mechanism M corresponding to extensive form A takes as
input the answers to each query in A and returns the allocation obtained
at the corresponding terminal node. This is, the input to the mechanism
consists of a path from the root node to a terminal node labelled with an
allocation. At node h, the edge corresponding to a truthful answer by all
agents in N(h) with a type profile θ is denoted by eh(θ), and E(θ) = {e ∈ E :
eh(θ) for some h ∈ H}. This is, E(θ) is the set of all edges corresponding to
truthful reports. The set E(θ) is an edge cover, i.e is a set of edges incident
3This is a standard requirement (Braˆnzei and Miltersen, 2015). For example, if agent
i is asked the query eval(i; 0.3, 1) and replies a value of 0, then if later asked the query
cut(i; 0, 0.5) his answer must be in the interval [0, 0.3).
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to every node in A.4 An alternative edge cover in which all agents except i
answer all queries truthfully, and agent i answers the queries as if he was of
type θ′i, is denoted byE(θ
′
i, θ−i). By our assumption of dynamically consistent
answers, each possible set of untruthful answers by each agent is associated to
a possible type in Θi. Mi(E(θi, θ−i)) denotes agent i’s individual allocation in
mechanism M when agents’ answers correspond to the set of edges E(θi, θ−i).
A special case of our definition is a direct revelation mechanism, when there
is a unique non-terminal node — the root h0 —, N(h0) = N and the query
for each agent is to fully reveal his type.
A mechanism M is called proportional if it guarantees to a truthful
agent a utility of 1/n regardless of what every other agent reports, i.e.
ui(Mi(E(θi, θ
′




A manipulation by agent i is a set of (partially) untruthful answers that
satisfy the consistency requirement, i.e., correspond to some type θ′i 6= θi.
A manipulation is called profitable (for mechanism M and type θi) if
ui(Mi(E(θ
′
i, θ−i)); θi) > ui(Mi(E(θi, θ−i)); θi). If some type of some agent
has a profitable manipulation, then mechanism M is called manipulable.
A mechanism is called strategy-proof (SP) if it is not manipulable, that is,
ui(Mi(E(θi, θ−i)); θi) ≥ ui(Mi(E(θ
′
i, θ−i)); θi) for all i ∈ N , for all θi, θ
′
i ∈ Θi,
and all θ−i ∈ Θ−i. This definition of SP is very demanding: it requires a
truthful report from every agent, every time he is asked to answer a query.5
Even if just one type of an agent has an incentive to give a non-truthful
answer to a single query, the mechanism is no longer strategy-proof.
Troyan and Morrill (2019) suggest a weaker version of SP for direct-
revelation mechanisms, which only compares the best and worst case scenar-
ios from both truthful and untruthful behavior. We extend their definition
to indirect mechanisms as follows. A mechanism M is not-obviously manipu-
lable (NOM) if, for any profitable manipulation of agent i, corresponding to







i, θ−i)); θi) ≤ inf
θ
−i






i, θ−i)); θi) ≤ sup
θ
−i
ui(Mi(E(θi, θ−i)); θi) (2)
4Edge covers represent a complete contingent plan of answers.
5Strategy-proofness is a notion more commonly used for direct-revelation mechanisms.
This extension to indirect mechanisms follows the definition of Kurokawa et al. (2013).
6They present this definition using maximum and mininum, which may not exists with
a continuous cake; instead we consider the supremum and infimum.
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If any of the previous two conditions do not hold for some θ′i, then θ
′
i
is said to be an obvious manipulation for agent i with type θi; and the
mechanism M is obviously manipulable. In other words, a manipulation
is obvious if it either makes the agent better off in the worst-case, or if
it makes him better off in the best-case. This is a strengthening of the
maximin strategy-proofness defined by Brams et al. (2006, 2008), who only
impose condition (1). Brams, Jones and Klamler write: “We assume that
players try to maximize the minimum-value pieces (maximin pieces) that they
can guarantee for themselves, regardless of what the other players do. In
this sense, the players are risk-averse and never strategically announce false
measures if it does not guarantee them more-valued pieces”.
Both relaxations of strategy-proofness have the advantages that agents do
not require beliefs about other agents’ actions, and that comparing best- and
worst-cases scenarios requires less cognitive effort than comparing expected
values using an arbitrary distribution over agents’ types. However, maximin
strategy-proofness is a mild property that is satisfied by a very large class
of mechanisms.7 On the other hand, NOM is a property that most classi-
cal proportional mechanisms in the literature fail, with the leftmost leaves
mechanism being a remarkable exception (Theorem 2).
Before we proceed to present some examples, we clarify a difference be-
tween the notion of indirect mechanisms that we use (standard in the com-
puter science literature) and the definition in economics (Moore and Repullo,
1988). In economics, each non-terminal node is labelled not with a query,
but with an action. Thus, to define leftmost leaves one could just specify
that, at each period t, an agent’s possible actions are to cut a cake at any
point, and the one who provides the smallest cut exits with the leftmost part.
There is no question where to cut: agents simply cut the cake wherever they
want. But, if one does not specify the query asked to each player, it is not at
all clear what truth-telling behavior is. Where should an agent with uniform
valuation over the cake cut when dividing a cake against 3 agents if he is
not asked a specific question? The computer science definition emphasizes
that the mechanism designer can make a mechanism hard to manipulate by
cleverly choosing which queries to ask at each node in the extensive form.
Indeed, if we slightly modify the queries asked in leftmost leaves, the mecha-
nism becomes obviously manipulable, as we show after the proof of Theorem
2.
7Chen et al. (2013) call maximin SP a “strikingly weak notion of truthfulness”.
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4. Results
We first show, using an example, that many classic cake-cutting proce-
dures are obviously manipulable.
Theorem 1. The cake-cutting mechanisms known as cut-and-choose, cut-
middle, Banach-Knaster last diminisher and Dubins-Spanier moving knife
are all obviously manipulable.
Proof. For simplicity, consider a cake-cutting problem with piecewise uni-
form valuations, i.e. agents either like or dislike certain intervals, and each
desirable interval of the same length has the same value. One agent, called
Blue, has valuations as in Figure 2.
.1 .2 .3 .4 .5 .6 .7 .8 .9
Figure 2: The preferences of a (blue) agent over the cake.
.1 .2 .3 .4 .5 .6 .7 .8 .9
(a) Cut-and-choose.
.1 .2 .3 .4 .5 .6 .7 .8 .9
(b) Cut-middle.
Figure 3: Obvious manipulations for agent blue (black arrow), supporting preferences for
the other agent (red), final allocation received by blue agent (green).
In the well-known cut-and-choose mechanism, Blue (the cutter) is asked
cut(blue; 0, 1/2). Truthful behavior requires him to cut at 0.5, guaranteeing
a utility of 0.5 in all cases. If Blue chooses a profitable manipulation instead,
say to cut at 0.4, the best case is that the other agent chooses the left piece
of the cake, leaving to Blue a utility of 0.75. Thus, in inequality (2), the
supremum at the left-hand side is at least 0.75 while the supremum at the
right-hand side is 0.5. Cut-and-choose is therefore obviously manipulable.
In the cut-middle mechanism, both agents are asked cut(i; 0, 1/2) = xi
simultaneously, and the cake is divided at x1+x2
2
, with each agent obtaining
the part of the cake which contains his cut. If Blue is truthful and cuts at
0.5, the best case is that the other agent cuts at ǫ (or 1 − ǫ) and thus the
cut point becomes 0.5+ǫ
2
≈ 0.25, so Blue receives 0.75 utility. Nevertheless,
if Blue chooses a profitable manipulation such as cutting at ǫ, the best that
could happen is that the other agent cuts at η < ǫ, and thus Blue receives a
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utility almost equal to 1. In inequality (2), the supremum at the left-hand
side is 1 and the supremum at the right-hand side is 0.75.
We conclude that cut-middle, too, is obviously manipulable.
Cut-and-choose and cut-middle are mechanisms for dividing a cake among
two agents. We now turn to mechanisms that can be used to divide cake
among two or more agents.
First, consider the Banach-Knaster last diminisher mechanism (Stein-
haus, 1948), in which agents are assigned a fixed order. The first agent is
asked the point x1 = cut(1; 0, 1/n), and is tentatively assigned the piece
[0, x1]. Then, the second agent has an option to “diminish” this piece: he is
asked the point x2 = cut(2; 0, 1/n), and if x2 < x1, then the previous tenta-
tive assignment is revoked, and agent 2 is now tentatively assigned the piece
[0, x2]. This goes on up to agent n. Then, the tentative assignment becomes
final: some agent k receives the piece [0, xk] and the other agents recursively
divide the remaining cake [xk, 1].
This procedure is obviously manipulable even with two agents. For ex-
ample, consider Figure 2(a). Suppose agent 1 answers truthfully x1 = 0.5.
If agent 2 answers truthfully x2 = 0.2, then he gets a value of exactly 0.5.
A profitable manipulation for agent 2 is to answer x′2 = x1 − ǫ: it yields a
utility of 1. This is true in both the best- and worst-case scenarios, which
are the same in this case.
We turn to the Dubins-Spanier moving knife (Dubins and Spanier, 1961),
in which a knife moves from 0 to 1 until the first agent stops it at the point
x for which ui([0, x]; θi) = 0.5, receiving himself the interval [0, x]. The best
that can happen to a truthful agent is that the other agent cuts the cake
at ǫ, so that he receives all the remaining cake which gives him almost 1
utility. However, once the moving knife has reached point x, a truthful agent
should stop the knife, implying that he gets 0.5 with certainty, whereas a
profitable manipulation would yield a higher utility in the best-case scenario
(one example is to stop the knife at 1 − ǫ). Thus, Dubins-Spanier moving
knife is also obviously manipulable.
We now present a slight variation of the Dubins-Spanier moving knife
mechanism, in which, in each period, all agents are asked the cut query si-
multaneously rather than sequentially. We call this variant leftmost leaves.
The leftmost leaves mechanism works as follows:
• In period 1 all agents are asked cut(i; 0, 1/n). The agent who cuts the
cake at the smallest point (denoted x1) leaves with the interval [0, x1].
In case of a tie, the agent with the smallest index of all those who cut
at x1 leaves with [0, x1].
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agent who submits the smallest point (denoted x2) leaves with the
interval (x1, x2]. In case of a tie, the agent with the smallest index of
all those who cut at x2 leaves with (x1, x2].




procedure continues until only one agent remains. That agent receives
(xn−1, 1].
Despite leftmost leaves being equivalent (in a sense in which we describe
below) to the Dubins-Spanier moving knife mechanism, they differ in terms
of obvious manipulability.
Theorem 2. The leftmost leaves mechanism is proportional and not-obviously-
manipulable.
Before presenting the proof, we present a few remarks about this result
and its possible extensions.
First, note that leftmost leaves is theoretically equivalent to Dubins-
Spanier moving knife mechanism, in that when applied to truthful agents
with the same types, both mechanisms always suggest the same allocation.
How can mechanisms that are theoretically equivalent, such as the two we
just presented, rank differently in terms of incentives? This idea goes back
to Li (2017), who shows that two equivalent mechanisms, such as the as-
cending auction and the second price auction, in which bidding truthfully is
a weakly dominant strategy, are different in terms of incentive properties for
boundedly rational agents. The intuition in both results is similar: both in
the second price auction and in leftmost leaves, agents have no restriction in
the prior about their opponents’ types when they reveal their type through
either their bids or their cuts; whereas in both the ascending auction and
the moving-knife procedure, the fact that the knife or the clock has reached
some point tells the agents’ something about their opponents’ types, and
thus modifies what to expect in the best- and worst-case scenarios.
Second, the leftmost leaves mechanism satisfies several other desiderata
that make it a good candidate to divide goods in practice. Is not only pro-
portional and NOM, but also procedurally fair (up to tie-breaks) (Crawford,
1977; Nicolo` and Yu, 2008), since agents’ identities do not affect the alloca-
tion produced. It also generates an assignment of a connected piece of cake
for each agent, a desirable property for applications such as the division of
land (Segal-Halevi et al., 2017).
Third, a follow-up question to Theorem 2 is whether leftmost leaves is
the only proportional and NOM mechanism in cake-cutting. The answer is
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no, as leftmost leaves can be slightly modified in several ways retaining both
properties. One of such modifications is to start cutting the cake from the
left instead of from the right.8 Another less trivial one is a modification
of the protocol of Even and Paz (1984), which works exactly the same as
leftmost leaves for n = 2 but requires fewer queries for larger values of n
(the proof is an almost verbatim copy of the proof of Theorem 2, so we omit
it).9 Obtaining a characterization of all NOM and proportional mechanisms
remains an interesting, albeit challenging, open question.
5. Proof of Theorem 2
We denote the leftmost leaves mechanism by M ll. We show that M ll
is not-obviously manipulable. Since M ll is an anonymous mechanism in
which the identity of the agents does not play a role, it is necessary to check
conditions (1) and (2) only for one agent, denoted by i.
First, we show that no manipulation yields a higher utility in the worst-
case scenario. We use the following lemma.









Proof. If xti is the smallest cut at period t, then the result is immediate.
Otherwise,
ui([x
t−1, xt]; θi) ≤
ui([x
t−1, 1]; θi)
n− t + 1
A direct implication is that the remainder of the cake [xt, 1] must be
8Rightmost leaves is the only mechanism to divide cake among two agents that is weakly
Pareto optimal, proportional and resource monotonic under specific restrictions on agents’
utilities (Segal-Halevi and Sziklai, 2018).
9The “leftmost leaves Even-Paz” mechanism works as follows (for clarity let n be a
power of 2). Given a cake [y, z], all agents choose cuts xi such that ui([y, xi]; θi) =
ui([y, z]; θi)/2. Let x
∗ be the median of the n cuts, rounded to the nearest smallest integer.
Then the procedure breaks the cake-cutting problem into two: all agents who choose cuts
xi ≤ x
∗ are to divide the cake [y, x∗), whereas all agents who chose cuts above x∗ are to
divide the cake [x∗, z]. Each half is divided recursively among the n/2 partners assigned
to it. When the procedure is called with a singleton set of agents {i} and an interval I it
assigns Xi = I. For example, if n = 4, agents cut the cake in two equivalent pieces and
the cake is cut at the second smallest cut. Then the two agents with the smallest (largest)
cuts play leftmost leaves on the left (right) side of the cake.
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worth at least n−t
n−t+1
of ui((x
t−1, 1); θi), i.e.
ui([x













Note that the left-hand side of the previous expression is the utility that
the truthful agent i would receive if he cut the cake at the smallest point
in period t + 1. If his cut was not the smallest at period t + 1, a recursive
formulation shows that he would receive a share of the cake that he values
even more in period t + 2. Thus, the worst that can happen to a truthful









ll(E(θi, θ−i)); θi) =
ui([0, 1]; θi)
n
Now we show that any manipulation at period t, xˆti 6= x
t
i, yields a utility
weakly smaller than ui([x
t−1,1];θi)
n−t+1
in the worst-case scenario.
If xˆti < x
t
i, in the worst-case scenario xˆ
t
i would be the smallest cut, and
agent i would therefore receive the allocation [xt−1, xˆti], which by construction
yields a weakly lower utility than the allocation [xt−1, xti].
In the other case, if xˆti > x
t
i, in the worst-case scenario the smallest cut
in period t, xt, would be such that xti < x
t < xˆti. Thus, the rest of the cake
[xt, 1] is such that
ui([x





In period t+1, agent i cannot choose a manipulation xˆt+1i ≤ x
t+1
i , as per
the previous step he would receive a smaller utility, so agent i must choose a
manipulation xˆt+1i > x
t+1
i .
But in the worst-case scenario, the smallest cut in period t + 1 is xt+1
such that xt+1i < x
t+1 < xˆt+1i , so that the rest of the cake [x
t+1, 1] is worth
less than
ui([x





Following this argument, we see that agent i’s only alternative is to receive
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the last piece of cake [xn−1, 1], which is, by construction
ui([x
n−1, 1]; θi) < ui([x
n−2, xn−1i ]; θi) < . . . < ui([x
t−1, xti]; θi) =
ui([x
t−1, 1]; θi)
n− t + 1
This concludes the proof that no manipulation yields a higher utility than
truth-telling in the worst-case scenario, so inequality (1) is satisfied.
Next, we show that no manipulation yields a higher utility in the best-case
scenario. We use the following lemma.





ll(E(θi, θ−i)); θi) = ui([x
t−1, 1]; θi)
This is, agent i, by being truthful in period t, can expect (in the best-case
scenario) to obtain the whole cake available in period t.
Proof. Let us remember that truthful agent i cuts the cake at a point xti such
that ui([x
t−1, 1]; θi) =
ui([xt−1,1];θi)
n−t+1
. In the best-case scenario, the smallest
cut at period t is xt < xti such that x
t = xt−1 + ǫ. This guarantees that
ui([x
t−1, 1]; θi) + ǫ
′ ≈ ui([x
t, 1]; θi) for an arbitrarily small ǫ
′, i.e. no valuable
piece of cake for agent i has been allocated. That we can find an ǫ so small
comes directly from the standard assumption that the utilities are divisible.
The best-case scenario is that all further smallest cake cuts xt+1, xt+2, . . .
are epsilon increments of xt, such that in the end agent i receives Xi =
[xn−1, 1], which gives him a utility arbitrarily close to ui([x
t, 1]), i.e. the
utility of eating all of the remaining cake available.
Since this is the maximum utility attainable, inequality (2) in the NOM
definition is satisfied. This concludes the proof that no manipulation gives a
higher utility to a truthful agent in the best-case scenario.
We conclude that no manipulation is better than truth-telling in either
the best or the worst-case scenario, thus no manipulation is obvious and
leftmost leaves is NOM.
Remark 1. A minor modification of leftmost leaves, sometimes used in the
literature (Procaccia, 2016), destroys the NOM of the procedure. In this
modification, at each period t, agents are asked cut(i; xt−1, 1/n).
To see that this variant is obviously manipulable, consider the case of an
agent who has uniform preferences over the whole [0, 1] interval and has to
cut the cake against 4 other agents. Her first cut must be x1i = 0.2, which
guarantees a utility of 0.2. However, suppose the lowest cut (submitted by
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someone else) was instead x1 = 0.1. In period t = 2, the remaining cake
is [0.1, 1] and if agent i is truthful, she should cut the cake at x2i = 0.3 so
that ui([0.1, 0.3]; θi) = 1/5 = 0.2. However, there is a manipulation that is
guaranteed to yield a higher utility in the worst-case scenario. If she cuts the
cake instead at xˆ2i = 0.325 (i.e. the point at which ui([0.1, xˆ
2
i ]; θi) = 1/4), in
the worst-case scenario, in which her cut is the lowest, she would guarantee
herself a utility of 0.225 > 0.2. If her cut was not the lowest, by continuing






t, she could make sure to receive a utility of at least 0.225 (Lemma 1),
which is larger than the worst-case scenario utility received by being truthful,
0.2. We conclude that the modified version of leftmost leaves is obviously
manipulable, and thus the choice of which query to make at each step of the
mechanism is crucial to make the leftmost leaves procedure not-obviously
manipulable.
6. Direct-revelation mechanisms
While leftmost leaves is proportional and connected, it does not satisfy
other desirable properties such as envy-freeness (no agent prefers the piece
of cake received by someone else over his own piece) and Pareto-optimality
(no other allocation is better for one agent and not worse for the others).
In the Robertson-Webb model, we could not yet find NOM mechanisms
satisfying these properties. For example, the classic mechanism of Selfridge-
Conway for three agents (see Brams and Taylor, 1996 for a detailed descrip-
tion) is envy-free, but it is obviously-manipulable. In this mechanism, the
first agent cuts the cake into three pieces of equal worth. A truthful agent
knows that one of those pieces will never belong to him, and thus he can
achieve a maximum utility of at most 0.67. However, a lying agent can cut
the cake in one piece of value 1− ǫ, and two pieces of almost no value at all.
In the best case scenario, he will keep the most valued piece entirely, showing
that the Selfridge-Conway procedure is obviously manipulable.
Interestingly, NOM is easier to achieve in the direct-revelation model.
Lemma 3. Every direct-revelation mechanism that always returns propor-
tional allocations satisfies inequality (1).
Proof. By proportionality, a truthful agent always receives a utility of at
least 1/n. Consider now an untruthful agent i who reports a type θ′i 6= θi
(equivalently, reports a utility function u′i 6= ui). Consider the case when
all other n − 1 agents have a utility of ui (the true utility of agent i). A
proportional mechanism must give each of these n − 1 agents a piece with
a value, by the function ui, of at least 1/n. Hence, the piece remaining for
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agent i has a value, by the function ui, of at most 1/n. Hence, in inequality
(1), the infimum is at most 1/n at the left and at least 1/n at the right, and
the inequality holds.
Lemma 4. Every direct-revelation mechanism that always returns Pareto-
optimal allocations satisfies inequality (2).
Proof. Consider the case when agent i is truthful, all other n−1 agents assign
a positive value only to a tiny fraction of the cake, and assign a value of 0 to
the rest of the cake. A Pareto-optimal mechanism must assign almost all the
cake to agent i. Hence, in inequality (2), the supremum in the right-hand
side equals 1 and the inequality holds.
Theorem 3. There exists a NOM direct-revelation mechanism that finds
envy-free and Pareto-optimal allocations.
Proof. The Nash-optimal mechanism is a direct-revelation mechanism that,
given n utility functions, selects an allocation that maximizes the product
of utilities. Such an allocation is known to be Pareto-optimal and envy-free
(Segal-Halevi and Sziklai, 2019), hence it is also proportional. Hence, by
lemmas 3 and 4, the mechanism it is NOM.
When the utility functions are picewise-constant, the Nash optimal mech-
anism can be computed by an efficient algorithm described by Aziz and Ye
(2014).
In contrast to the leftmost leaves rule, the Nash-optimal rule may return
disconnected pieces. Moreover, it is known that any Pareto-optimal envy-
free rule may have to return disconnected pieces (see Example 5.1 in Segal-
Halevi and Sziklai (2018)). Since Pareto-optimality is crucial in the proof
of Theorem 3, it remains an open question whether there exists a NOM
mechanism that is both envy-free and connected.
A related question is whether there exists an algorithm that finds pro-
portional, Pareto-optimal and connected allocations. If such an algorithm
exists, then by Lemmas 3 and 4, it is NOM.
7. Conclusion and Experimental Evidence
Although it is impossible to cut a cake in a strategy-proof manner that
is not completely unfair to some agent, we can divide a cake in a fair, pro-
portional way that cannot be obviously manipulated using an easily imple-
mentable mechanism called leftmost leaves.
Troyan and Morril’s notion of NOM not only allows us to escape the
tradeoff between fairness and incentives in cake-cutting, but also helps us to
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better understand real-life behavior when dividing an heterogeneous good.
In the first lab experiment comparing cake-cutting mechanisms, Kyropoulou
et al. (2019) report truthful behavior in NOM cake-cutting mechanisms in
44% of the cases, whereas the respective number for OM ones is of 31% (the
difference is statistically significant with a p-value of 0.0000). In particular,
leftmost leaves was significantly less manipulated than Banach-Knaster last
diminisher when agents played against 2 opponents (difference of 29 percent-
age points, p-value of 0.0000) and 3 opponents (difference of 16 percentage
points, p-value of 0.0000). The Even-Paz modification of leftmost leaves
(which is NOM) was also significantly less manipulated than Banach-Knaster
(difference of 35 percentage points, p-value of 0.0000).
Although in general NOM gives us testable predictions that map rela-
tively well to observed behavior, it is intriguing that the Selfridge-Conway
procedure also reports high rates of truth-telling, comparable to those of
NOM mechanisms. Explaining this puzzling phenomenon remains an open
problem which we leave for future research.
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